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"Just Membership: Between Ideals and Harsh Realities"JUST MEMBERSHIP: BETWEEN IDEALS
AND HARSH REALITIES
AYELET SHACHAR
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
ABSTRACT
Inthispaper,Ayelet Shacharbeginsbyrestatingthemainideaofherimportant bookThe
Birthright Lottery :Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard,Harvard University Press,
2009)and thengoeson toaddressinaconstructivespirit themain themesraisedby the
five preceding comments written by scholars in fields of law, philosophy and political
science.
RÉSUMÉ
Dans cet article, Ayelet Shachar commence par rappeler l’idée centrale de son livre im-
portant The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard, Harvard Uni-
versityPress,2009)avant derépondredemanièreconstructiveauxcinqcommentairesqui
précèdent,rédigés par des experts dans les domaines du droit,de la philosophie et de la
science politique.
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2My thanks to Martin Provencher for organizing this symposium on The
Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard University Press,
2009), and to the editors of The Ethics Forum for agreeing to host it. I am espe-
cially grateful to the contributors — five experts hailing from the fields of law,
philosophy, and political science, and from different parts of the world — for
their thoughtful engagement with my work. I have learned from their insightful
and generous responses, even when I disagreed. I have, of course, also found
much that I agree with. My commentators raise a confluence of important is-
sues, more than I can fully address in this short reply. But to set the stage, let me
begin by briefly articulating the central ideas of the book before turning to ad-
dress, in a constructive spirit, the main themes raised by the commentators.
Although birthright is no longer a basis for privilege in any field of public life,
it not only survives but thrives when it comes to the assignment of political mem-
bership — the realm we typically associate with democracy, participation, and
accountability, making citizenship the domain where we would least expect to
find inherited entitlement living on.This puzzling persistence and dominance of
birthright in our laws and our imagination when it comes to articulating princi-
ples for allotting what Michael Walzer calls “the most important good” (Walzer
1983, 29) — equal membership in the political community — is at the center of
my inquiry in The Birthright Lottery.
In this book, I propose a new way of thinking about the intergenerational trans-
fer of citizenship as a special kind of property inheritance, highlighting “the un-
justified privileges encased in the principle of birthright citizenship, whether
understood in terms of jus soli or jus sangunis” (Ivison, 13). Unlike the abstract
quality of works in political philosophy, the book begins by accepting the non-
ideal reality and complexity of existing legal categories, analyzing them criti-
cally and then reconstructing them to offer new conceptual frameworks and
innovative institutional designs to address some of the most charged and pressed
political realities of our times: membership and migration. This emphasis on
legal structures and categories fertilizes the book’s discussion of the striking
analogy between the (now deeply discredited) medieval property mechanism of
transmitting wealth and power down the generational line through entailed es-
tates and today’s almost taken for granted transfer of citizenship by birthright to
“heirs in perpetuity” as a special — and extremely important — kind of inher-
ited privilege. In his elegant and succinct style, Peter Spiro summarizes the sig-
nificance of this reconceptualization: “[Shachar] introduces a radical and
compelling new framework for confronting the dilemmas of birthright citizen-
ship, one that promises to transform debates in the area” (Spiro, 63).This recon-
ceptualization pivots on the “seminal observation that birthright citizenship is
best described as a form of entail property” (Novogrodsky, 50).
To recognize the surprising similarities in form and function between birthright
citizenship and inherited property of this particular kind is to identify a striking
exception to the modern trend away from ascribed status. This only makes the
link that persists between political membership and station of birth more puz-
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2zling and in urgent need of a coherent explanation. This is the task I have un-
dertaken in The Birthright Lottery.
The stronghold of station of birth in the assignment of political membership is
entrenched by two legal principles: jus soli (“by birth on the territory”) and jus
sanguinis (“by bloodline”). As a result, access to affluent countries in our un-
equal world is still reserved primarily to those born in a particular territory or to
a particular ancestry.Those born outside the circle of members have only a slim
chance of ever overcoming their initial draw in the membership entitlement
sweepstakes.
And what a significant sweepstakes this is: in our world, the global disparities
are so great that “some are born to sweet delight”, asWilliam Blake memorably
put it, while others (through no fault or responsibility of their own) are “born to
endless night.” The reality of our world is that the endless night is more preva-
lent than the sweet delight. No less than 97 percent of the global population who
are assigned citizenship by the lottery of birth either choose, or are forced, to
keep it this way. A recent report solemnly captures this last point: “Even in
today’s mobile and globalized world, most people die in the same country in
The incumbent system of perpetual membership inheritance is hard to defend in
any circumstances. But when we look at the enormous disparities in well-being,
human rights, and quality of life in different countries around the world, it be-
comes ever more difficult to justify.
Whereas the archaic institution of the hereditary transfer of entailed estates has
been discredited in the realm of property, in the conferral of citizenship we still
find a structure that strongly resembles it. Inherited entitlement to citizenship
not only remains with us today; it is by far the most important avenue through
which individuals are ‘sorted’ into different political communities (Brubaker
1992; IOM 2010; UN DESA 2008). Contrary to the general trend toward the
breaking down of ascriptive barriers and replacing them with mechanisms of
choice and fair distribution, under the incumbent regime of birthright, member-
ship is automatically designated only to those who ‘naturally’belong.And who
naturally belongs according to current citizenship laws? Only those who are
born on the territory of the state or into its membership community. (Note the cir-
cularity of this validation of the naturalness of the transfer of citizenship.) It is
not open to anyone who would voluntarily consent to membership or is in dire
need of its associated benefits. This stands in tension with core liberal and dem-
ocratic principles that seek to minimize the impact of social and structural hier-
archy and to relieve us of the weight of the circumstances of our birth.
Indeed, part of my project is to dispel (or de-naturalize) the notion that the
birthright transmission of membership is simply ‘natural’ and ‘apolitical’. A
main impetus for writing the book was to bring this system of unequal endow-
ment acquired through the public inheritance of citizenship — a system that is
both invisible and taken for granted — under critical appraisal. Víctor Mu￱iz-
Fraticelli nicely captures this last point, stating that the book succeeds in “de-
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2naturalizing citizenship and making it more amenable to much-needed reform”
(Mu￱iz-Fraticelli, 19).
The reliance, by law, on birthplace and bloodline in the allocation of citizenship
is not a result of some genetic or innate endowment that we cannot control, such
as the color of our eyes. Rather, it is a human-made regime of legal entitlement
that our citizenship laws perpetuate and then disguise under the cloak of a nat-
ural given. Once we see this transmission regime for what it is, the possibility
for reassessment and revision opens up.
The existing system of membership allocation did not fall from the sky. It is the
result of human agency. We can alter it, just as we can preserve it. The latter
route simply asks us to continue our complicity in preserving an unjust situation.
The former clearly requires hard work: breaking old habits of thought and adopt-
ing creative reformulations instead.
The Birthright Lottery begins to do just that. My commentators have raised
thoughtful questions about the breaking of these old thought-habits and about the
kinds of creative reformulations that could be adopted in their place. Given space
constraints, I will synthesize my remarks in a way that allows me to incorporate
the core insights developed by the five commentators, grouping them into two
broad themes: 1) the conceptual analogy to inherited property; and 2) the ‘worth’
of citizenship. I explore each topic in turn and, where relevant, address the pos-
sibilities for developing viable alternatives.The pressing realities on the ground
— as well as the rise of a ‘Time of Outrage’which has inspired millions to re-
member and continue to fight for freedom from want, freedom from fear, and to
rekindle a spirit of social mobilization and non-violent resistance against injus-
tice both domestically and globally — add a further sense of exigency to the
book’s project of finding fresh answers to old questions of justice and mobility;
membership and migration; inherited privilege and unequal opportunity.
THE CONCEPTUAL ANALOGYTO INHERITED PROPERTY
As Duncan Ivison’s essay elucidates with precision, according to the broad view
of property and membership that developed in the book, “what each citizen holds
is not a private entitlement to a tangible thing, but a relationship to other mem-
bers and to a particular (usually the national) government that creates enforce-
able rights and duties” (Shachar 2009, 29). This social relational aspect of
political membership is crucial for understanding the kind of responses I ad-
vance in the book, a point to which I return later.
In developing the conceptual analogy between birthright citizenship and inher-
ited property, I begin from two presumptions. First, my analysis starts with the
world as we find it, with its many imperfections and already established insti-
tutions (including states, passports, regulated mobility and guarded borders) in-
stead of hypothesizing about how to start de novo at the level of ideal theory.Yet,
even if we recognize and endorse the value of citizenship (as I do in the book),
this is not a good enough reason to accept, without challenge, the existing trans-
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2fer regime of birthright citizenship.
My second presumption is this: ideas matter, especially unsettling ideas that ven-
ture into unchartered territory. The power of ideas — their value in expanding
and rewriting the universe of the possible — is what attracts me here. Unlike ad-
vocates of world citizenship who seek to abolish bounded membership alto-
gether, I believe that greater promise lies in diminishing the extreme inequities
in life prospects that are presently attached to ascribed membership status under
the existing birthright regime.
This new approach strikes a new balance between political membership and
global justice — without substantively detracting from the enabling qualities of
membership in a self-governing polity. While there are a number of ideal-type
responses that might get us closer to accomplishing this vision, I focus in the
book on the idea of placing justice-based restrictions on citizenship’s automatic
transfer regime — not by restricting access to membership to birthright heirs, but
through targeting the more fungible aspects of their tremendous opportunity-
enhancing windfall. The birthright privilege levy, which is elaborated in the
book, offers one such concrete mechanism. It calls attention to the situation of
those whose life-chances are dramatically shaped by their initial draw of citi-
zenship in the birthright lottery, an allocation that in the twenty-first century is
still, astonishingly, determined by nothing but blood and soil. This is the “huge
moral problem” (Smith 2011) that the book seeks to tackle.
Once we acknowledge this problem for what it is, the prospect of placing upon
recipients of “unearned privilege” (as John Stuart Mill would put it) the re-
sponsibility to provide at least a minimal threshold of wellbeing, or subsistence,
to those excluded from membership by nothing but accident of birth becomes
harder to escape.Whether to interpret this as a strong egalitarian commitment or
a weaker international baseline welfarism is of course open to debate, and will
eventually have to be worked out through various democratic deliberations and
reiterations (Benhabib 2011). But the crux of my argument is this: once the anal-
ogy to inherited privilege is placed at center stage, it becomes harder to justify
the massive intergenerational transmission aspect of citizenship that has long
been cloaked under the cover of birthright’s ‘naturalness’. It provides a founda-
tion for advocating and advancing obligations of justice within and across bor-
ders, yet without jumping to the quasi-tyrannical conclusion that we must abolish
tout court the space in which semi-bounded, self-governing political communi-
ties can flourish.
Mu￱iz-Fraticelli’s erudite and engaging essay extends the analogy to inherited
property beyond the common law sources explored in the book, bringing in fresh
insights from civil law and private law. This is a creative and fruitful terrain to
uncover; I hope that he and equally talented interdisciplinary scholars continue
to plough and toil in this direction of exploration. Where I found Mu￱iz-Frati-
celli’s analysis particularly illuminating is in the distinction he emphasizes be-
tween the arbitrariness of birthright citizenship and its unequal consequences,
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2asking which part of this dilemma my critique seeks to tackle. The simple an-
swer is both, but if pressed to choose between them, I would certainly empha-
size the former: The injustice of allotting citizenship — something that is so
crucial for our identity, for our sense of security, freedom and place in the world,
for our political voice and our life opportunities — according to nothing but cir-
cumstances of birth that are fully beyond our control. The fact that we live in a
dramatically unequal world, where the “location premium” (to draw from
Branko Milanovic’s terminology) remains exponentially important, makes this
injustice all the more pronounced for the parties concerned. The critique of
birthright citizenship advanced in the book would hold even in a world of full
equality across borders and regions, but it becomes that much more dramatic in
a world of severe inequality like our own.
Mu￱iz-Fraticelli’s path departs from mine, however, at the point at which he
tries to extend and expand the citizenship-as-inherited-property analogy that I
have drawn up as an heuristic device — much as political theorists use the so-
cial contract as a heuristic tool to illuminate important insights about the rela-
tionship between individuals and governments — from the conceptual and
metaphorical plane into a historicized claim. Nothing in my analysis justifies or
demands this move. Indeed, I reject it, just as theorists who use the ‘social con-
tract’ as a heuristic device would treat an interpretation that explores where,
when, and whether such a social contact was signed, agreed and applied, as
slightly missing the point of the intellectual exercise.The goal of the thought ex-
periment, in both cases, is to make visible what often goes unnoticed: legal order
and political authority is not a natural order, but a human creation that requires
legitimization and justification, especially by those whom it most directly af-
fects (Dahl 1970; Goodin 2007; Shapiro 1999; Whelan 1983).
This overextension of the argument also helps address Mu￱iz-Fraticelli’s skep-
ticism about whether it is “true that birthright citizenship is the main culprit in
the system of global inequality?”The answer is plainly in the negative.As I take
pains to show in the book, my analysis rests on the assumption that birthright cit-
izenship itself is not a cause of global inequality. It is better described, just like
inheritance, as a conduit or mechanism to pass down a differentiated welfare
and opportunity in time, granting accession to hereditary privileges to the few
while denying it to the many.
Another way to put the point is this: birthright citizenship does not create global
disparities, but it reifies and perpetuates very different life prospects through the
automatic intergenerational transfer of membership entitlement by virtue of
blood and soil criteria. Scholars of an earlier era expressed the same disdain by
highlighting the unwarranted and unjustified weight given to station of birth, re-
jecting the idea that ‘chance, not choice’can, and ought, to determine what coun-
try and government we will be asked to bear allegiance to, merely by virtue of
station of birth. This is a weak moral link. Speranta Dumitru captures this last
point perceptively in her essay: “The idea that people should not be treated ac-
cording to the circumstances of their birth is generally regarded as a minimal re-
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2quirement of justice” (Dumitru, 35). It is here that the reconceptualization of
birthright citizenship’s transfer regime as analogous to a complex and now
largely discredited form of hereditary transfer of entailed estates, cascading
down the generational line to “their body” — a restricted group of birthright
heirs — has the strongest bite.
Generously endorsing this reconceptualization, Duncan Ivison treats it as “an
enlightening way of approaching the issue of global justice and our obligations
to those excluded from our borders” (Ivison, 14).With Ivison, I share the notion
that the social-relational aspect of the broad conception of citizenship is always
open to reinterpretation and must stand in dialogue with concrete democratic
demands raised by various social actors, most significantly, those from the out-
side looking in, even when their claims challenge the very boundaries of the
membership community. I take his speculation that “[c]itizenship is (at least in
principle) much more fluid and changeable…than property tends to be” (Ivison,
15) as open to empirical assessment. Even if it proves correct, it would provide
a friendly amendment to my argument: both citizenship and property are com-
plex legal and distributional systems that can, and often do, change over time.
Moreover, such changes require collective action.An owner’s rights in her prop-
erty are neither self-executing nor the result of a state of nature; rather, they rely
upon collective recognition and a web of “relations of entitlement and duty be-
tween persons” (Grey 1980, 79). This of course still leaves open to deliberation
and recalibration the precise nature of these relations. Property relations, just
like citizenship relations, are never immune to reconstructive inquiry, whether
in law or in philosophy. This last point fits well with the thrust of my argument,
and with Ivison’s call for elucidating the conceptual resemblances as well as po-
tential variations between the entail of property and the entail of political mem-
bership.
But there is more to Ivison’s critique. He astutely takes issue with another aspect
of the analogy: if we take seriously the book’s embrace of a more inclusive and
relational model of citizenship, he asks, then why draw the analogy to property
and inheritance which inevitably involve a complex matrix of boundary making?
This is an excellent query to raise, which touches on the book’s insistence that
citizenship is a multi-layered and multi-textured institution and ideal, and can-
not be reduced to a unidimensional or singular factor, without losing the quali-
ties that make it valuable and worth preserving. No less significant for the
purposes of our analysis is the recognition that political membership involves
both gate-keeping and opportunity-enhancing dimensions, both of which are ad-
dressed in great detail in the book and cannot be repeated here. But it is worth
describing here the purpose of the citizenship-as-inherited-property framework
depicted in the book. It works on at least two planes: first, it allows us to see
something so familiar and ‘natural’as the entail of citizenship in a less familiar,
and unsettling, light. Second, it enables us to inject into the identity-heavy citi-
zenship debate the immensely rich body of literature that critiques the unfet-
tered transfer of entitlement in property to a dynastic estate’s progeny.The legal
category of entailed bequests from generation to generation without restraint
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2has been a major source of social and political reform ever since the revolu-
tionary proclamation that we are all born free and equal (Yack 2011). I wish to
instill the same sense of discomfort in what has remained a mostly taken-for-
granted route for distributing political membership — the birthright nature of the
entail of political membership, which secures a tremendously valuable public
inheritance for the few while denying same for the many, on account of arbitrary
circumstances of “chance not choice.”
Virtually all the giants of social and political thought — from Adam Smith to
John Stuart Mill, from Ronald Dworkin to Robert Nozick — agree, from dif-
ferent ideological perspectives, that restrictions can (and should) be placed on
the perpetual transfer of unearned entitlement. This cross-fertilization of prop-
erty theory and citizenship law informs the kind of responses that I explore in
the book within the intellectual parameters of seeking tangible and justifiable
legal responses to curb these entail-like perpetual transfers in the citizenship do-
main. This shift in perspective empowers us to resist and locate cracks in the
presently unfettered connection between station of birth, political membership,
and radically unequal citizenship bequests; a concern that becomes ever more
acuteif“nothing can be done to go beyond the bounds set at birth” (Dumitru,38).
Instead of a false choice between the antipodes of a world of open borders ver-
sus the restrictionist position that endorses resurrecting previously relaxed bor-
ders (for example, amongst Schengen States in Europe), The Birthright Lottery
challenges us to envision new ways to reduce the correlation between station of
birth, political membership and unequal fortunes.
The basic dilemma is this: inheritance violates the ideal of equality of starting
points; “wealth is opportunity, and inheritance distributes it very unevenly.”The
solution, for most thinkers, is to impose restrictions against the unrestrained in-
heritance of swollen fortunes.As one account nicely puts it, “justice demands a
constant erosion of accumulated fortunes to limit this influence” (Henderson
1926, 12-13; Haslett 1986). It is intuitively clear that, in an unequal world, the
perpetual inheritance of political membership contributes to a larger pattern in
which opportunity is distributed very unevenly. As we have already seen,
birthright citizenship in a well-off polity carries with it not only important iden-
tity and belonging values but also significant enabling implications for the re-
cipient. In spite of this, sparse attention has been paid in the literature to the
significance of the transfer regime of membership and its pernicious effects on
the distribution of voice and opportunity on a global scale.This is the black hole
of our contemporary thinking about citizenship.
In contrast, all modern theories of property and justice place significant checks
and constraints on the social institutions that transmit inequality. Even Thomas
Jefferson, an iconic defender of property, echoes this notion, imbuing it with
radical implications when stating that the “portion [of the earth] occupied by
any individual ceases to be his when he himself ceases to be, and reverts to so-
ciety.” Many others, from different ideological quarters, share this intuition.The
debates among them focus on what, precisely, reverts to society — the whole es-
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2tates, part thereof, or the reminder after fulfilling certain justified expectations,
is to name but a few possible resolutions. The crucial point here is that any of
these options is preferable over the current citizenship status quo of unburdened
intergenerational transmission of prized membership titles.
Unlike Ivision’s nuanced discussion and acceptance of the distinction between
the broad and narrow conceptions of citizenship, and in contrast with Mu￱iz-
Fraticelli’s expansive interpretation, Speranta Dumitru takes a literal, if not out-
right reductionist, interpretation of the citizenship as inherited property analogy.
She ignores the inheritance aspect almost completely, which is to misunderstand
the core objective of a project like mine that focuses on the transfer of mem-
bership. Dumitru also pays little heed to the distinction I draw between the broad
and narrow conception, uncritically accepting instead as-a-given the highly
atomistic and possessive individualistic framework that is the trademark of the
narrow (or “rivalrous”) conception of social interaction that operates in a purely
laissez-faire, Shangri-La-like world. This leads her to see only exclusion,
whereas in law, practice and social theory, as Ivison reminds us, “we know from
as far back (at least) as John Locke, property is both inclusive and exclusive”
(Ivison, 15; emphasis added). This insight is shared by the recent vintage of
property theories that take aim at the exclusion conception, labeling it as “as an
exaggerated and rather damaging notion because it tends to improperly bolster
the cultural power of libertarian claims” (Dagan 2012, 12). Property is always
subject to limitations and obligations, even toward third parties that have no title
or possessory right. If this is true in this traditionally ‘private’realm of social life,
which has received the strongest legal protection, then the same rationale should
apply to the public realm of governmental exercise of power that bears dramat-
ically on the human rights of those seeking to get in, as well as those already
within the boundaries of the citizenry body (Shachar 2011). In short, the same
intuition that justifies a degree of regulating and taming of repeated transfers of
propertied fortunes applies, with equal if not greater force, to the domain of cit-
izenship ‘entails’.
Dumitru’s response to these vital challenges is, in essence, to espouse the demise
in toto of “the power to control movement and entry into land” (Dumitru, 41).
On this account, we will live in a world in which territorial access is permitted to
all, although such access will not be connected to a chance to gain membership.
Dumitru goes further in claiming that “there must be no conceptual relationship be-
tween controlling citizenship and refusing access to land” (Dumitru, 42). Under
this alternative universe, access to the territory is totally separated from the right
to establish citizenship. But on what account of greater mobility does this grim
picture rely, and must we accept it? Dumitru holds a laissez-faire market-based
vision of a world in which claims for inclusion are detached from the acts of
membership or mobility, potentially leading to a situation whereby those not
born as members are left permanently without an avenue to establish a right to
stay, if they so wish, in the political community into which they have already
moved and where they have already established roots, facing instead a constant
state of deportability and the risk of a “bare life” (Agamben 1998).This is a very
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2peculiar solution to the problem of unequal opportunity: downgrading the hard-
earned collective achievements of civil and political measures of political mem-
bership and replacing them with “unconstrained survival-of-the fittest market
relations, with the dispossessed falling helplessly to the wayside” (Spiro 2008,
134).
This approach may well have the effect of “entrenching a division between cit-
izenship and what we might call subjecthood.”As Ivison puts it, “[t]he distinc-
tion between citizenship and non-citizenship, in other words, becomes
meaningful for all the wrong reasons.This is arguably what happened withTurk-
ish migrants in Germany, where they were originally admitted as guest-workers
and allowed to stay for long periods of time, but remained cut off from the full
range of civil and social rights possessed by German citizens” (Ivison, 12). In-
stead of resolving the problem of unequal opportunity, which Dumitru so ele-
gantly analyzes, denial of citizenship perpetuates its worst status implications.
What Dumitru calls a freer world could thus be re-characterized as a dark
dystopia. We will have access to territorial spaces, according to this vision, and
we will be free to sell out labor power to the highest bidder, but we will have
nothing beyond that: no protection, no rights, no participation, no voice, no com-
munity, no citizenship. Instead of leveling up rights and opportunities in the
name of a libertarian vision of freedom and equality, Dumitru’s solution boils
down to opening up borders but closing down citizenship and taking away what-
ever protections it grants us as equal members of a shared political community.
This is no utopia at all, especially not for the weak, the incapable, or the desti-
tute. It is the morphing of the social-relational bonds of mutual responsibility and
stakeholding (Baubock 2005) into mere ‘trades’ and pure market-based rela-
tions, here, operating within and across borders interchangeably.
There is no guarantee, however, that access to land per se, without the protec-
tions or rights of citizenship and personhood, and without the creation of transna-
tional institutions or overarching rights regimes, will generate a more equitable
distribution of voice and opportunity either globally or locally for those who
need it or desire it most. The latest statistics show that approximately only 1.75
million immigrants are admitted annually by leading OECD countries.The pop-
ulation residing in the world’s poorer or less stable regions amounts to roughly
4.5 billion. This leads to a ratio of 1:1500 between those granted admission and
those who may wish it. Even if the world’s wealthy countries declared their bor-
ders as open as possible, the problem would not dry up.
Another misconception in Dumitru’s analysis is found in what she calls the
sedentarist mistake, a view that presumably holds that a “world without mobil-
ity and change is a desirable one” (Dumitru, 11). Here, I fear that Dumitru stands
on shaky ground. She confuses a descriptive analysis with a normative claim.We
live in a world in which the vast majority of the population is locked into the ini-
tial assignment of political membership at birth (UN DESA and IOM interna-
tional migration reports offer the latest global figures) and where the options for
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2overcoming this birthright lottery are extremely slim. This is not anyone’s
“sedentarism mistake”; these are the observable, real-world facts that we must
acknowledge, especially if we wish to begin to challenge and dismantle them.
If I had thought this state of affairs desirable and morally defensible, I would not
have written a book that challenges the very foundations of this system. Indeed,
my endeavor rests on the assumption that social and legal categories, including
borders and membership boundaries, are never as fixed and immutable as those
in power (or those who gain from the status quo) would like us to believe.
Noah Novogrodski’s illuminating essay reminds us that ‘liminal statuses’, like
the ones implicitly endorsed by Dumitru, are back in vogue in some parts of the
world and are prevalent in places like the Gulf States (Novogrodski, 6). There,
migrant workers gain access to the territory and its market, but are never con-
sidered as potential candidates for inclusion as members. This is a replay of the
Gastabeiter moral hazards all over again, yet the precarious status of these tem-
porary migrants (Anderson 2010) is even more pronounced and alarming given
that they reside in countries that have weaker democratic and constitutional pro-
tections. This makes the situation of those permitted to cross the border — but
prohibited from joining the community of members — fraught with vulnerabil-
ities and insecurities: they lack adequate employment rights; they often work in
substandard health and safety conditions; they have access to few if any viable
legal channels to demand or have enforced fair labor conditions; and they are de-
prived of the power to express their voice politically.
The attempt to disaggregate working bodies from full humanity accentuates the
cracks and tensions embedded in the laissez-faire approach to resolving the deep-
seated membership and justice dilemmas that we face today. Lest we forget that
the vision of depriving those holding liminal statuses from the basic opportunity
to secure membership in the community of equals is hardly a new or promising
invention. From the exclusion of slaves, women, and metics inAncient Greece
to Jim Crow laws in the United States, the technique of territorial presence with-
out full rights and status, with its excruciating human costs, is unfortunately all
too familiar. This last point is perhaps best expressed in a now-classic passage
from Spheres of Justice: “[migrant] workers, then, are excluded from the com-
pany of men and women that includes other people exactly like themselves.
They are locked into an inferior position that is also an anomalous position; they
are outcasts in a society that has not caste norms, metics in a society where met-
ics have no comprehensible, protected, or dignified place. That is why the gov-
ernment of guest workers looks very much like tyranny: it is the exercise of
power outside its sphere, over men and women who resemble citizens in every
respect that counts in the host country, but are nevertheless barred from citizen-
ship” (Walzer 1983).
We can do better than that. Instead of burying our heads in the sand or repeat-
ing past mistakes, greater promise lies in reassessing what is worth preserving
and what is no longer sustainable in our inheritance of regimes of entailed-like
membership.
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2WHAT ISTHE“WORTH”OF CITIZENSHIP?
We can detect two diametrically opposed responses to this query in the com-
mentaries: the ‘maximalist’ and the ‘minimalist’ views (Joppke 2011, 39).
Novogrodsky’s crisp analysis represents the former. Spiro’s spirited argument
speaks for the latter. The maximalist argument fits squarely in line with a long
tradition of seeing immigration as a transitory stage. Novogrodsky articulates
this view emphatically, stating that citizenship “sits at the end of the member-
ship spectrum; Shachar’s insights and powerful property analogy tell us some-
thing about the previously unexamined value of birthright inheritance”
(Novogrodsky, 53).
If citizenship holds this kind of utmost value as far as membership goods go, ar-
gues Novogrodsky, then it can usefully serve as a benchmark against which to
assess more accurately the “lesser forms of legal status, including lawful per-
manent residence … [and the] many shades of long-term visitors — landed im-
migrants, guest workers and resident aliens — [all of which] are steeped in the
propertied qualities and economics of migration” (Novogrodsky, 50-51).This is
a creative and valuable spin-off that takes the book’s core argument as a seedling,
which is then planted on the fertile terrain that is already soaked by the “Alpha-
bet soup” of legal definitions referring to those who lack full membership but
hold a nascent relationship with the admitting country, its society and its econ-
omy. When this relationship blooms into full membership, the unilateral trajec-
tory of immigrant to citizen has been concluded.
But there is a dark side, too. What happens when newcomers who have already
settled in the new country are denied “membership status and the value associated
with the security of belonging” (Novogrodsky, 51)? This situation raises the
fraught moral and ethical dilemmas of “exclusion from within,” to which I have
devoted the book’s final part.As Novogrodsky’s graciously puts it, “The Birthright
Lottery takes this [Arendtian] view a step further by naming and measuring the
previously unexamined worth of ascribed citizenship” (Novogrodsky, 52). This is
a framework that serves Novogrodsky as a springboard to develop a nuanced
matrix to identify and potentially redress the different shades or gradations of un-
just deprivation of membership. One measure of response that I have proposed
in the book is the introduction of an innovative legal principle, jus nexi, that
open up a new path to acquire citizenship for those not “naturally-born” into the
political community, thus allowing us to overcome some of the deep-seated flaws
ofrelyingonbirthrightsimpliciter.Inpractice,jusnexicouldoperatealongsidetra-
ditional jus soli and jus sanguinis principles. It may become ever more influential
in a world of greater interdependence and mobility. I envision this principle as re-
medial:anewrootoftitlethatwouldgrantanopportunityforfullinclusiontothose
who already belong (as a matter of social relations and externally observable con-
nections to the new country), but who are nonetheless legally treated as less than
equal. It is not designed or justified to operate in a reverse manner; namely, as re-
stricting rather than expanding the pool of receipts of citizenship, with all of its en-
abling and human-flourishing potential.
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2Take the case of Sandra McIntyre, a retired grandmother who has lived her
whole life in Canada: “I grew up here, got my education here, got married and
raised kids here, and worked here all my life. So I’ve always assumed I was a
Canadian. My loyalties go to Canada, and I’ve never lived anywhere else” (Sea-
man 2008). It came as a shock to learn, in her late fifties when she applied for a
passport in preparation for travel abroad, that she was naked of the basic rights
of citizenship: for instance, the right to enter and exit one’s home country. Lit-
tle did Sandra know that circumstances fully beyond her control — her birth
just south of the border (she was only a few hours old when her parents, lawful
immigrants to Canada, drove back home, with their newborn in tote, across the
border from NewYork to Ontario at Niagara Falls) — would legally turn her into
a ‘foreigner’ in Canada, the very country in which she had lived for over fifty
years, voted in every election, volunteered in her community, and was a full
member by any criteria but the harsh letter of the law.Alas, Sandra was not born
in Canada, ergo she was not a citizen. Dura lex, sed lex (the law is hard, but it
is the law).
Sandra is not alone. In the United States, hundreds of thousands of children born
outside the United States who were brought into the country in their infancy,
and then raised and educated in English asAmericans through and through, hold
the same uncertain membership status. The sword of deportation hangs over
them at all times. Contrary to the familiar image ofAmerica as a beacon of hope
and opportunity for the “huddled masses, yearning to breathe free,” the United
States has more recently been dubbed the deportation nation (Kanstroom 2007).
Whereas Sandra McIntyre was at least offered a chance to ‘immigrate’ to her
very own home country of Canada, children who grew up American, and have
been shaped by this country’s American-dream ethos, are categorically denied
a path to legal membership in its citizenry body.
The scholarly literature refers to these children as members of the “1.5 genera-
tion”: “[t]hey are not the first generation because they did not choose to migrate,
but neither do they belong to the second generation because they were born and
spent [a brief] part of their childhood outside the United States” (Gonzales 2007,
2). Under current immigration law, there is no path to regularize their status.
Many members of the 1.5 generation “have been in this country almost their en-
tire lives and attended most of their K-12 education here.”Yet, because they are
in the country without legal status, “their day-to-day lives are severely restricted
and their futures are uncertain. They cannot legally drive, vote, or work. More-
over, at any time, these young men and women can be, and sometimes are, de-
ported to countries they barely know” (Gonzales 2007, 2).
Individuals facing this uncertainty of status are keenly aware of citizenship’s
value.As a multidimensional concept and institution, citizenship’s varied inter-
pretations and dimensions are neither fixed nor closed. Most commentators
agree, however, that “citizenship entail[s] membership, membership in the com-
munity in which one lives one’s life.” (Held 1991, 19-20). This is precisely the
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2kind of membership that Sandra, and similarly situated individuals, wish for.
For them, gaining equal status as citizens is a lifeline and a matter of just mem-
bership. It is about establishing a legal connection to close the gap between their
social experience of membership and their lack of entitlement to inclusion in
the only political community they know and perceive as home.
Members of the 1.5 generation, tired of repeated legislative failures to address
their precarious situation, have recently turned to political mobilization and dem-
ocratic action, which in itself demonstrates just how deeply the admitting soci-
ety has shaped their horizon of expectations and the lexicon they now utilize to
resist the pending threat of deportation. This grassroots campaign for legalizing
undocumented students in the United State takes its cues unmistakably from
America’s rich civil rights traditions and imageries: they engage in sit-ins, march
to Washington, escape the shadows by telling their own compelling life stories
publically (while risking harsh consequence by self-identification as one of those
lacking legal status), under the slogan of “unlawful and unafraid”. These stu-
dents draw upon the emancipatory language of citizenship and the promise of a
fresh and fair start — the quintessential American Dream, showing just how
much this country in which they have grown has shaped them in its image — to
challenge their own exclusion from its promised land of immigration. They are
living proof of the human costs associated with “exclusion from within” and the
misguided vision of separating access to territory from access to the citizenry
body, for those who wish or need it desperately.
Like so many other once-excluded groups and constituencies who were barred
from formal citizenship (on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, and so
on), the appeal here is to the justice of reforming existing legal categories and
their harsh implementation, so that the promise of equal membership is extended
to new subjects and new domains. For these DREAMers, as they are known, the
adoption of jus nexi-like mechanisms for gaining access to full membership in
the community in which they live their lives would not only remove the hang-
ing sword of deportation and expulsion from the only country they know as
home. It would also grant them a tangible and concrete measure of freedom and
security that comes with the acquisition of something so precious and hard to
earn for those not initiated by birth into the ranks of entailed citizenship: just
membership.
Let me close by turning to the ‘minimalist’ view of citizenship, which Spiro’s
analysis masterfully exemplifies. Spiro’s postnational edifice leads him to con-
clude that citizenship “might well go begging” (Spiro, 63). He may well be cor-
rect in this assessment in reference to the circumstances of a very tiny elite of
the world’s jet setters who already possess full membership in a well-off coun-
try, although even they do not appear keen on giving up their privileged mem-
bership entitlements any time soon.When we open the lens in order to bring the
rest of the world into view, we find that there are many more applicants knock-
ing on the doors of well-off polities than new admission slots to fill. This is ev-
idenced along all major streams of migration: family reunification, skills based,
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2and humanitarian causes. Even among the category of the ultra-rich, which fits
most closely to Spiro’s cosmopolitan elite, we find a growing number of “mi-
grant millionaires” (as David Levy fittingly calls them) who are willing to open
their checkbooks and wallets, offering stacks of cash as the tender with which
to secure the good of membership in a desired destination country. This raises a
conundrum. If citizenship is not worth much, how can we explain the growing
demand for, and supply of, investor-admission routes that are offered by a grow-
ing number of countries? These proliferating programs require hefty invest-
ments. The current investment rate stands at US$1 million in the United States,
Euroᾬ1 million in Germany, and in the UK, individuals possessing personal as-
sets amounting to not less than GBPﾣ2 million are encouraged to apply. This is
clearly not your average-Joe target population. However, those with the finan-
cial might have not been discouraged by these towering figures; on the contrary,
they are voting with their feet. It is those who wish to enter based on more tra-
ditional grounds, including family-based migration or the various humanitarian
streams, who more often than not go begging.
Another way to gauge the persistent interest in, rather than decline of, the lure
of citizenship is to look at the numbers of worldwide subscribers to America’s
‘diversity’ visa category, which has exceeded 10 million applicants annually.
Less than 50,000 of these 10 million applicants will gain a chance to start a new
life in their chosen promised land of immigration. Their willingness to invest
their time and energy and to fill in their bid for such a slim chance of success
seems to refute the view from the ivory tower that gaining legal access to per-
manent residence and embarking on the road to citizenship is unimportant or re-
dundant. The harder issue to discern, which Spiro is absolutely correct to
emphasize, is whether permanent residence or citizenship is the ‘homerun’. We
can only speculate here based on what the statistics are telling us. Among im-
migrants to Canada and the United States, for example, those who were born in
poorer, less democratic and less stable regions of the world display dispropor-
tionately higher naturalization rates than those from other OECD countries, and
they do so more quickly.This is particularly evident with highly skilled migrants
— another category of migrants that is close in profile to the globetrotter that
Spiro is referring to. Other things held equal, a high-tech engineer from India or
China will take on American citizenship, whereas a Canadian who has moved
to the US to fulfill her career ambition is far less likely to do so. Ditto a French-
man that followed his love to establish a shop in Italy, and so on. It is quite sim-
ply too easy, then, to bid farewell the understanding of citizenship as incredibly,
immensely valuable.
This state of affairs offers us a fresh reminder that even if those who inherit cit-
izenship have come to take it for granted, those who do not are keenly aware of
its value. In today’s world of severe inequality, some are taking increasingly
dangerous routes and means of passage to reach the greener pastures of Europe
and North America. Others who have made it into these territories are occupy-
ing the lesser forms (or ‘liminal statuses’) of membership, forsaking the kind of
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2basic protections that most natural born citizens would take for granted. Some
would like to further exploit these tradeoffs and celebrate them as representing
the road ahead. An equally convincing interpretation is, however, to see these
acts as testament to the desperation of the current situation and the corrosive ef-
fects of the incumbent regime of membership allocation. This motivates the ur-
gent need to improve matters, here and now.
Along with Spiro, I share the belief that citizenship is bound to change in the 21st
century and beyond. But we do not necessarily agree on the direction of the
change. Spiro treats it as a losing cause, a dead horse, a fossil from a bygone era.
I hold greater faith in the ideal and institution of equal membership in the polit-
ical community as providing a baseline of security and opportunity to the indi-
vidual that no other human rights regime (regionally or internationally) have yet
achieved. The scale and scope of citizenship has changed dramatically in the
past and it may well change in the future. Human rights regimes may well come
to flourish and fulfill their tremendous potential. This will generate a new and
welcome balance between sovereignty and humanity, and local and global jus-
tice. Alas, we cannot read the tea leaves of this complicated tale; too many in-
tervening factors may derail a happy ending. So let us begin with the here and
now. The main challenge that we face today is not to speculate about the rise or
fall of citizenship in some distant future. A more pressing challenge, both ethi-
cally and prudentially, is to ensure that whatever the spoils of membership —
from the most mundane service-oriented definition that refers to building roads
and laying pipes for clean water to flow to remote villages, to the enabling
qualities that are associated with fair access to maternal health care and equal ed-
ucation for girls, to the security and opportunity that democratic governance and
a vigilant human rights record can grant all of us by protecting freedom of speech
and expression just as it includes freedom from want and from fear — they, and
the many other crucial ‘properties’of citizenship, are not reserved only for those
born into the ranks of privilege. It is time to open up and shake up this fine in-
stitution. There is no better way to start than by revisiting its fixed and unnec-
essarily rigid transmission regime.
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